Showing posts with label UPB. Show all posts
Showing posts with label UPB. Show all posts

Thursday, December 24, 2015

9 brief criticisms of UPB

Molyneux quotes are in italics.
 
1) Self-defense also cannot be required behaviour, since required behaviour (“don’t rape”) can be enforced through violence, which would mean that anyone failing to violently defend himself could be legitimately aggressed against. However, someone failing to defend himself is already being aggressed against, and so we end up in a circular situation where everyone can legitimately act violently against a person who is not defending himself, which is not only illogical, but morally abhorrent. (Page 87) But self-defense is violent, unavoidable from the standpoint of the aggressor being defended against. Therefore it falls in the category of ethics, and is either prohibited or required, according to the argument Molyneux gives in UPB. So if it is not required, it is prohibited. Or is it special somehow, related to enforcement? In effect, the entire UPB book is a justification of self-defense and rule enforcement. Molyneux should have made it clear how this works.

Enforcement requires justification, because it takes a different form in ordinary life than it does in debate. In debate, rules are enforced by pointing to infractions. Violations of the rules weaken a debater's case, sometimes demolish it. We don't put people in jail for making a mistake, we just don't believe them. People don't enforce debate rules by means of physical punishment. Debate is an ideal world of nonviolence. How does Molyneux base enforcement on the ideal of debate? He ignores the question.

2) Preference gives a ranking. Given a set of choices, a preference determines which alternative is chosen. UPB needs a set of prohibitions. Molyneux says almost nothing about what you ought to do, discussing instead what you should be punished for. Using the word "preference" as jargon introduces confusion and equivocation. UPB is really universally prohibited behaviour, maybe universally enforced behaviour.

3) Do I believe the coma test? Why shouldn't a man in a coma be treated as if he had reverted to infancy, or as an animal or rock would be treated, on a temporary basis? How can we draw conclusions about ordinary persons this way? An infant needs a guardian, and so does a man in a coma. If either an infant or a man in a coma were somehow able to injure another, the guardian would be responsible, not the infant, and not the man in the coma. Does Molyneux excuse the infant only, or both, or neither?

4) Any Positive obligation must be constantly being fulfilled at all times? I am able to cobble up an elaborate explanation of this idea of Molyneux's, but I am still tempted to count it as a reductio ad absurdum. That is, if I can reason to that conclusion, some of my assumptions must be wrong. The fact that the argument is so elaborate is a danger sign. At the very least, Molyneux needs to explain this better, because it is a very surprising result. He treats it almost as obvious. He bases the idea on universality. Why not think of a positive obligation in analogy to a gas tank, you have to fill it up before it gets empty?

5) Do I care about the 2 guys in a room? Molyneux's critics love to try to twist that scene, for instance, trying to show that it is not logically impossible for the 2 to be mutually obligated to kill each other. If we accept the success of the move against moral obligations based on the coma test, why is the 2 guys test even useful? There is nothing that I can consciously be doing at all times, because I have to sleep. So why would it matter if there were additional absurdities or logical impossibilities if there were two of us? If we have already established that there are no positive obligations, what does this test accomplish?

6) Can we derive a moral truth using UPB? It makes sense to reject a moral proposition that contains logical contradictions or physical impossibilities, and call that "false." But if a moral proposition passes the tests, does that prove it is true? Are we sure we have eliminated all the sources of falseness? He does not so much derive or prove rules as eliminate some. Actually, this would be a respectable accomplishment in itself (if successful), but he pushes it further than he can justify.

7) Molyneux talks about the hypothetical imperative as "if you want X you must do Y or use Y." But the way he uses it, the Y is always a negative, "not steal," "not murder," "not rape." He is clear about what you must not do, vague about what you must do. In fact, he denies that you must do anything. Stef's version of the hypothetical imperative should be, "if you want X, you should not do Y."

8) Molyneux begs the question with most of his example tests. Murder is defined as wrongful killing. There is no difficulty proving that wrongful killing is wrong. The difficulty arrives when we try to draw a clear line between wrongful killing and other sorts, such as legitimate self-defense, accident, etc. Molyneux does not draw this line.

9) Words based on the idea of validity (valid, validate, validity, etc.) are used almost 200 times in the text. Sometimes it can be interpreted as logical validity, others as validity according to the UPB system. In some other contexts it is used in a confusing way, to signify correctness in general or accuracy or something like that. How can a concept or idea be valid or invalid, without reference to a standard of validity? For example: If this “null zone” is valid, then no logical proposition can ever hold. (Page 14). If he means "true," why not say it? 

As you may have noticed, none of these criticisms is deadly to UPB. The fact that Molyneux has made mistakes doesn't disprove his idea. It just means Molyneux has failed to give us good reasons to think he is right.

Sunday, July 6, 2014

UPB Comment, page 28-30


Page 28: According to UPB, a valid theory is logically consistent and empirically testable. 

Page 29: Moral propositions claim that human beings should act in a particular manner, or avoid acting in a particular manner. 
Page 30: A personal preference is what?
A universal preference, is what is objectively required, or necessary, assuming a particular goal. If I want to live, I do not have to like jazz, but I must eat. “Eating” remains a preference – I do not have to eat, in the same way that I have to obey gravity – but “eating” is a universal, objective, and binding requirement for staying alive, since it relies on biological facts that cannot be wished away. Isn't all human action goal oriented? Life is a universal goal? Is this the same as universally preferable?
Ethics as a discipline can be defined as any theory regarding preferable human behaviour that is universal, objective, consistent – and binding. Where does this come from?
Page 32: If you want to live, it is universally preferable that you refrain from eating a handful of arsenic."   it is universally preferable that your theories be both internally consistent and empirically verifiable. “Universally preferable,” then, translates to “objectively required,” but we will retain the word “preferable” to differentiate between optional human absolutes and non-optional physical absolutes such as gravity.
One adopts a goal, then a causal relationship exists between the goal and the means of achieving it. Sometimes the means is unique, sometimes many means are equally preferable. Why talk about preference or preferability at all?
Similarly, if ethical theories can be at all valid, then they must at least be both internally and externally consistent. In other words, an ethical theory that contradicts itself cannot be valid – and an ethical theory that contradicts empirical evidence and near-universal preferences also cannot be valid.
What does that mean? How can an ethical theory contradict empirical evidence, since it is not a factual claim? Feasibility? What are near-universal preferences?

Thus in ethics, just as in science, mathematics, engineering and all other disciplines that compare theories to reality, valid theories must be both logically consistent and empirically verifiable. 

Comment on UPB page 49


Certain preconditions must exist, or be accepted, in order for ethical judgments or theories to have any validity or applicability. Clearly, choice and personal responsibility must both be accepted as axioms. If a rock comes bouncing down a hill and crashes into your car, we do not hold the rock morally responsible, since it has no consciousness, cannot choose, and therefore cannot possess personal responsibility. If the rock dislodged simply as a result of time and geology, then no one is responsible for the resulting harm to your car. If, however, you saw me push the rock out of its position, you would not blame the rock, but rather me. To add a further complication, if it turns out that I dislodged the rock because another man forced me to at gunpoint, you would be far more likely to blame the gun-toting initiator of the situation rather than me. 
Should we count situations of coercion as exceptions to moral principles, or violations, for the purpose of enforcement or self-defense? 

Thursday, May 1, 2014

UPB FAQ 0.2

I started this project determined to understand UPB as Stef understands it, give a better explanation of it, and fix its problems if I could or point out the problems if I couldn't. I don't think I can do it yet, so this FAQ is still incomplete. My understanding has gaps and even the parts that I've made sense of may not match Stef's ideas. Feel free to comment.

What does the UPB jargon mean?

When he discusses UPB, Stef uses a number of words in a surprising way, distinct from common usage: ethics, morality, universality, inflicted, avoidable, aesthetic, binding, enforceable, preference and evil are important examples. I posted a UPB jargon blog entry trying to point out what you need to notice when he uses these words. Ethics and morality are used interchangeably, and the boundary between ethics (enforceable) and aesthetics (not enforceable) is marked by avoidability. All moral propositions must be universal in the sense that they apply to all moral agents at all times and places. All morality is interpersonal, as in, if your actions have no impact at all on another person, or the impact is avoidable, then ethics says nothing about them.

What is UPB?

UPB stands for universally preferable behaviour. It is a framework used for testing moral propositions. That means, you find a moral proposition and you subject it to tests. Those that fail are false, those that pass are true. True means enforceable, though Stef has left the details of enforcement vague.
The main requirement for moral propositions to pass the tests is universality. The proposition must apply to all moral agents at all times and places. Stef uses universality to argue for the coma test and the 2 guys in a room test. Moral agents must also have free choice, in the sense that no one is explicitly coercing them. That is, if I hold a gun to your head and threaten to kill you if you disobey me, I have nullified your responsibility for your actions, according to Stef.
The coma test claims that, due to universality, no one is obligated to do anything that a person in a coma is not also obligated to do. Since a coma victim can't do anything but lie there and breathe, no one is required to do more.
The 2 guys in a room test investigates whether 2 persons can be moral at the same time and place. If a moral proposition excludes this possibility, it fails the test. 
If you forget everything else, UPB is about condemning hypocrisy.

How does Stef argue for the ideas of UPB? 

He uses the idea of a performative contradiction to derive some fundamental norms and principles, such as universality, that cannot be denied by persons using fair argument. Using those principles as a basis, he derives the concepts and tests that he calls UPB. Then he subjects various moral propositions to the tests.

What is a performative contradiction?

In order to disprove UPB, you must engage in argument. But the activity of argument itself presupposes certain norms and premises. Anyone who rejects those norms and premises cannot engage in argument and remain consistent. Their activity depends on claims that they deny, and hence their denial calls their own conclusions into question. 
A simple example of this would be for me to say out loud, "I am dead." Because the dead do not speak, the way that I made my claim contradicts its content. Similarly, any argument that used logic to conclude "therefore logic is worthless" qualifies as a performative contradiction. If you use a typewriter to type out the message, "I can't type," you contradict yourself in the act of expressing your idea. 
Hoppe and Habermas have used the performative contradiction in a similar way previously.

What are some of the norms and premises of argument that Stef derived?

  • "You should correct your opinion if it is objectively incorrect."
  • "objective facts exist, and that objective truth is universally preferable to subjective error."
  • Morality is a valid concept.
  • Moral rules must be consistent for all mankind.
  • The validity of a moral theory is judged by its consistency.
  • universality: A rule that applies to our debate, here, today must apply to any debate, anywhere, any time.
  • Entering into any debate requires an acceptance of the realities of choice, values and personal responsibility.
  • Etc. There are more.

How does Stef derive the tests and jargon from the norms and premises?

He gets the two tests from universality. I have a blog entry where I try to reconstruct how he got the idea of strong universality from the performative contradiction. I am curious how his other jargon connects to his basic derivation. For example, Stef draws the line between ethics and aesthetics using the concept of avoidability, but I am not sure really what that means or how it relates back to the performative contradiction or some other derivation. Consent seems to draw a clearer line for me, that is, I think involuntary interaction covers the same territory that Stef uses unavoidability for. If you're speaking and I don't consent to listen, I can leave. If you stab me without my consent, I can't avoid the injury.

How does Stef solve the is/ought problem and bring normative content into his system?

Here's a list of possibilities that occurred to me. I am not sure whether Stef accepts any of these, or all.
  • UPB does not derive the moral propositions it tests. It just tests them for logical consistency and universality. They begin the process with moral content, so if is/ought causes problems,  the problems concern the moral propositions, not UPB.
  • Stef's performative contradiction move derives norms of debate from the act of debate. By choosing to engage in debate, the debater endorses the norms of debate and so cannot consistently make arguments that deny these norms. It forms a hypothetical imperative: if you want to argue, you must accept the norms of argument, at least while you're arguing. Then argue for universality, that accepting the norms during argument implies accepting them in general.
  • By their actions, persons opt in or opt out of moral agency. Persons who opt out or deny UPB or claim that morals are subjective effectively assert that force requires no justification. By their actions they deny that any reason exists not to treat them like infants or animals. 

Who does UPB apply to? 

Here also I have some possibilities and confusion:
  • those who make moral arguments
  • those who make arguments
  • Those who choose moral agency
  • Those who choose to live in society
  • Everything

What are some criticisms and critics of UPB?

Most of the criticisms are shallow, in the sense that, even if true, the criticism does not seriously damage the basic idea, as opposed to a deep criticism, which if true, would defeat the basic purpose of UPB. For instance, many critics have attacked the 5 syllogisms in the section beginning on page 40 for basic logical errors such as non sequitur. I agree that this section seems to have been written carelessly and contains numerous errors. But this is not a grade school math assignment, where we can find a mistake and mark it with a big red "x". The serious critic must try to see past any superficial errors to find out whether the basic idea works or not. The ideal critic would first understand UPB, then restate it with error removed, if possible, and then point to any problems.
Critics seem to misunderstand the performative contradiction step, or ignore it, rather than arguing against it. If any of them understood it, they must disagree with about its importance, because none of them mentioned it in a serious way.
Noesis gave two notable criticisms of UPB on the FDR forum. First, can moral nihilism pass the UPB tests? Second, does the definition of UPB beg the question? 
Noesis claimed that a version of moral nihilism can pass the UPB coma test and 2 guys test. In effect, she accepts, for the sake of argument, the basic ideas of UPB but proposes that nothing is prohibited, no enforcement is justified. Here is my response. She wants the set of enforceable prohibitions to remain empty, so she cannot propose that enforcement be prohibited, just that there is no objective justification for it. But UPB collects and evaluates any and all moral propositions. If a moral proposition is not universal, or is logically contradictory, it is discarded. But otherwise, it may add to the set of enforceable propositions. So Noesis' proposition adds nothing to the set of prohibitions, but it cannot prevent other propositions from passing the tests and adding content to the set of prohibitions. Her proposition would need to show that all other moral propositions should fail the test. But this is a claim about moral claims, not a moral claim, so it does not qualify for the test. Noesis would perhaps reply that the set of propositions that pass the UPB tests would not be logically consistent, because her proposition says it is okay to do anything, which contradicts the other propositions which all prohibit something. I'm not sure whether Stef would mind, so long as the set of prohibitions remains consistent. Or perhaps he would counter that "do whatever you want" is not really a moral proposition. Ultimately, I think this was a cute trick, but what Noesis really wants is a way to deny the entire idea of UPB.
She takes a shot at that by claiming that Stef defines his jargon in a way that sneaks in the concepts and distinctions that he wants, without basing them on logic or the performative contradiction. This is called begging the question, it is a way to sneak the conclusion of the argument into the premises. I'm not sure how Stef should reply. When I first noticed his use of strong universality, I was very confused and could not see how he came up with it. Later, after much struggle, I saw how he might be able to use the performative contradiction to derive strong universality. So I am reluctant to say it can't be done with the other terms and concepts at the foundation of UPB, just that I have not understood how to do it yet.
David Gordon criticized Stef's use of strong universality, but oddly ignored the performative contradiction step. I say oddly, because I associate Gordon in my mind with his Mises Institute colleague, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, who uses a similar performative contradiction prominently in his work. Gordon also balks at the idea of biological UPB: Is it not obvious that Molyneux has confused two different senses of "universally preferable behavior"? Biological laws are, as even our author elsewhere realizes, descriptive regularities; Molyneux fails utterly to show that acting in accord with such laws to keep oneself alive has anything to do with moral obligation.
This criticism, though accurate, is shallow. The biological version of the UPB idea is not essential to Stef's project. In fact, I can't understand why he even mentioned it, as Gordon's objection hits the target. But the target is at the periphery, not the center, of Stef's conceptual territory. 
Stef declares that UPB is an "umbrella term" that applies to the scientific method, logic, empiricism, debating, language, and ethics. He gives no explanation of how this works, and fails to include the biological sense mentioned by Gordon, though Stef does use that idea in several places. I am tempted to lump these together as "fields of truth-seeking, using logic and evidence." But then we should subtract language and bio-UPB, and probably add mathematics. And it is clear that Stef's understanding of the scientific method differs from mine.
Regrettably, I have lost the link to the pages that made the following criticisms, so I can't give links or credit. One critic claimed that self defense and property rights break Stef's strong universality. For example, imagine two situations where I have just punched mr. X in the face. In one, he had threatened me and struck me first, and I fought back in self defense. In the other, he did nothing before I attacked him. The critic claimed that if the rule was truly universal, it would not only abstract from persons identities, locations, and times, but also their circumstances. I think the critic used a quote from Stef to support this interpretation of universality, perhaps this one describing theft on page 101: It is morally wrong for all people in all situations at all times and under all circumstances. I disagree that Stef has committed himself to this idea, though I agree that Stef has not made the boundaries of universality clear. Do we know how he determines which aspects are universal (times, places, persons) and which are not (context of previous violence, who owns what, etc.)? 
Universality is based on the nature of argument. If I make a successful argument now, and write the words of the argument down, and someone else repeats the argument later in a different place, how can the argument fail? It can fail in the new context only if the original argument depended somehow on the original context of the argument. 
The next criticism is closely related. This critic accused Stef of using value laden words without justifying them as part of the theory. For instance, murder versus kill, steal vs. take, etc. Killing is a general and value-neutral category, which includes subcategories such as murder (wrongful killing), killing in self-defense, accidental killing, suicide, and mercy killing. So by evaluating propositions such as "murder is not universally preferred behaviour" Stef is stating a tautology. Murder is wrong by definition, but how do we define murder? Given knowledge about a killing, is it murder or not? Stef should have derived this somehow, instead of just assuming it. I think it is safe to approximate Stef's meaning as defining murder as intensional killing, involuntary on the part of the victim. Stef could clarify this, but does it matter? If Stef lets someone else define murder for him, his method lacks the objectivity he seeks.  UPB must give us this answer. Does it?
Opposite vs. negation: More than one critic quibbled about Stef's use of the word "opposite" in the context of the "2 guys in a room" test, claiming he should have used the word "negation" instead. I claim that they should have read with more care and charity. In that case they would realize that Stef has eliminated all possible cases but two: a moral proposition either prohibits something or requires something. When there are only two alternatives, there is no difference between the opposite of a choice or the negation of that choice. Both just mean "the other choice." They may wish to criticize the argument by which Stef eliminated the other possibilities, but it's silly to quibble about his word usage.
I have some criticisms of my own, in a forthcoming blog entry.
FDR user labmath2 provided this criticism: "Punishment and self defense. What counts as self defense? If someone trespasses on my property can I shoot them on sight or am I required to warn them first? Can I shoot someone for breaking a contract in defense of my stolen service or property? What about punishment, can there be punishment that involves initiating violence against someone? If I murder someone, can men with guns come and detain me or is self defense the only allowed form of aggression."

Rule enforcement has similar issues. 

Self-defense also cannot be required behaviour, since required behaviour (“don’t rape”) can be enforced through violence, which would mean that anyone failing to violently defend himself could be legitimately aggressed against. However, someone failing to defend himself is already being aggressed against, and so we end up in a circular situation where everyone can legitimately act violently against a person who is not defending himself, which is not only illogical, but morally abhorrent. (Page 87)

But self-defense is violent, unavoidable from the standpoint of the aggressor being defended against. Therefore it falls in the category of ethics, and is either prohibited or required, according to the argument Stef gives in UPB. So if it is not required, it is prohibited. Or is it special somehow, related to enforcement? In effect, the entire UPB book is a justification of self-defense and rule enforcement. Stef should have made it clear how this works.

Enforcement requires justification, because it takes a different form in ordinary life than it does in debate. In debate, rules are enforced by pointing to infractions. Violations of the rules weaken a debater's case, sometimes demolish it. But enforcement by means of physical punishment is abnormal in the context of debate, if not necessarily nonexistent. Debate is an ideal world of nonviolence. It is not clear how the act of arguing presupposes violent enforcement of rules.

Enforcement is not just a subset of self-defense, it has a special justification. All of UPB aims at justifying it. But UPB says almost nothing about enforcement. We could also see UPB as a metaphysical classification scheme that we can use to label all actions good or bad? (If we lump neutral and good together.) This just means bad = a violation of an enforceable rule, good = not a violation of an enforceable rule. This is peculiar. Maybe UPB is a theory of evil, not a theory of good and evil? Or it is a theory of enforcement.
Here is a summary of UPB critics from a rather biased source. It contains many dead links. I suggest doing a web search of upb and critique, if you are interested.
There is a lot of material in the forum at FDR, but it is not very helpful. I hope this FAQ and my other blog entries help a little. Stef has many videos, but they tend to cover the same things, and would be difficult to organize into a sensible treatment of UPB.

Monday, April 28, 2014

Questions for Stef

Here are some questions I still have about UPB, and my guesses at answers. Quotes from Stef are in italics.
1) How do we differentiate ethical propositions from aesthetic propositions in UPB using avoidability?  How does Stef derive this category distinction from the norms of argument or pure logic? If that's not how he derived it, where does it come from?

Avoidable: Stef uses this word in the ordinary way, but it is hard to objectify.  When critics try to claim that moral nihilism passes the UPB tests, they are claiming that everything is avoidable, using Stef's terms. Clearly, some things are not avoidable. So they would try to attack that distinction, claiming that unavoidable things are aesthetic, that Stef's definition begs the question, it's arbitrary, has no basis.

Non-violent actions by their very nature are avoidable. Page 48. This capacity for escape and/or avoidance is an essential characteristic differentiating aesthetics from ethics. Page 50. For the moment, we can assume that any threat of the initiation of violence is immoral, but the question of avoidance – particularly the degree of avoidance required – is also important. Page 51.
This sounds like consent to me. Why not just use consent as the criterion derived from argument, and define violations of consent as violations of UPB and bad?

2) Morality and ethics:
Any theory that justifies or denies the use of violence is a moral theory, page 49. Morality is defined as an enforceable subset of UPB, page 76. The subset of UPB that examines enforceable behaviour is called “morality,” page 125. Ethics is the subset of UPB which deals with inflicted behaviour, or the use of violence. Page 48. 

    inflicted behaviour and use of violence 
    • mean the same thing?
    • are two distinct categories with some overlap?
    • Completely separate categories  (if so, explain inflicted)?
    3) Ethics must involve 
    • violent violations of universal rules
    • violent enforcement of universal rules
    • either? 


    4) Who does UPB apply to? 
    • those who freely choose moral agency and responsibility.
    • those who make moral arguments
    • those who make arguments
    • all Human beings  
    • some other category, or needs more explanation

    5) Is/ought defeated by "if I want X I must do Y" and performative contradiction. How do I defeat the is/ought when debating? My debate opponent explicitly chooses
    • moral agency 
    • to seek knowledge of good and evil
    • to live in society
    • to make a moral claim, an ought
    • to engage in debate, implicitly accepting the premises and norms of debate.
    • all of the above
    • some of above
     
    6) What does enforceable mean? Can be enforced by anyone? Must be enforced? Why is it a separate category? How is it derived from the performative contradiction?

    7) Binding: what does it mean? I read that as "the rule applies". I am confused because "binding" seems to have more of a connotation of "consequences are guaranteed to occur." But this cannot be the case. Stef seems to use it to deny choice. Personal preferences do not bind anyone, but logical necessities, math, etc. cannot be chosen arbitrarily, in that sense they are binding. Because UPB is all about deciding what behaviour is enforceable, I guess "binding" = "enforceable?"

    The fundamental difference between statements of preference and statements of fact is that statements of fact are objective, testable – and binding, page 22. Ethics as a discipline can be defined as any theory regarding preferable human behaviour that is universal, objective, consistent – and binding. Naturally, preferential behaviour can only be binding if the goal is desired. If I say that it is preferable for human beings to exercise and eat well, I am not saying that human beings must not sit on the couch and eat potato chips. What I am saying is that if you want to be healthy, you should exercise and eat well. [...] It is true that if a man does not eat, he will die – we cannot logically derive from that fact a binding principle that he ought to eat. page 30. We all know that there are subjective preferences, such as liking ice cream or jazz, which are not considered binding upon other people. On the other hand, there are other preferences, such as rape and murder, which clearly are inflicted on others. There are also preferences for logic, truth and evidence, which are also binding upon others (although they are not usually violently inflicted) insofar as we all accept that an illogical proposition must be false or invalid. Those preferences which can be considered binding upon others can be termed “universal preferences,” or “moral rules.” Page 40.


    8) Choice: Moral agents must also have free choice, in the sense that no one is explicitly coercing them. That is, if I hold a gun to your head and threaten to kill you if you disobey me, I have nullified your responsibility for your actions. You are not responsible, you are not a moral agent while I am controlling you that way.
    ?

    Sunday, February 9, 2014

    Strong universality in UPB

    The concept of universality that Stef uses in UPB is very strong. Any rule that applies to someone must apply to all moral agents at all times and all places. How did he derive this concept, and who should we categorize as moral agents?
    Ordinarily universality might mean "applies to all members of a category." So non-UPB morality can create all sorts of subcategories of moral agents and construct arguments based on the characteristics of those categories. These moral propositions flunk the UPB tests. Why does Stef reject them? He does not really explain this in the book, but we can squeeze out the meaning.
    Because Stef uses a performative contradiction as the basic move for deriving UPB, debate and the norms of debate stand at the center of UPB. Stef claims that those who engage in debate cannot deny the premises and norms on which debate relies. (Here debate is interpreted broadly, so that no one could present a disproof of UPB without engaging in debate.) 
    What do we know about the participants in a debate and their arguments? We know that they participate willingly, otherwise it is not debate but interrogation or something like that. They must have some common language, an ability and willingness to debate, and broad agreement on what it means to debate fairly and honestly. Without these presuppositions, debate fails as a means for seeking truth. Of course, debaters may fail to follow the rules in a particular case, either from error or from a desire to deceive, but they must put up a show of playing fair, or no one will bother to engage them.
    Can we limit the time or place where a debate may occur or may have occurred? No. As long as willing participants are seeking truth, debate may proceed, between anyone, any time, any place. For that reason, the norms of debate should be similarly eternal, independent of location, and indifferent to the identity or category of participants. The only limitation that makes sense is their willingness and ability to debate.
    If you have made a claim in a debate, and then go do something else, does your claim expire? Do you stop believing it and asserting it? For the most part, no, if you honestly assert something at one time and place, you could have asserted it just as honestly elsewhere, later, or earlier. If you come to doubt your claim, you can make assertions about the new evidence that raised your doubts. Hence, only a complete nihilist, who believes absolutely nothing and makes no truth claims could ever deny the norms of argument. And if he did deny them, then he would no longer be a complete nihilist. Even making an argument that X is false requires that one accept the norms of debate.
    What about persons who are not yet, or no longer, or temporarily unable to debate? Appoint a guardian.
    What about animals? Guardian or owner?
    What about rocks? Owner.
    What about persons who are able to debate, but unwilling to embrace moral agency? Treat them like animals, or infants, or sages? Perhaps not sages.
    Someone must take responsibility.

    Tuesday, January 28, 2014

    Noesis' critique of UPB

    Noesis raised at least two interesting questions about UPB. Can some form of moral nihilism (moral anti-realism?) pass the UPB tests? And did Stef beg the question when defining some of his jargon, instead of deriving his results from logic as he claims?

    page 31


    Noesis, on 01 Feb 2011 - 01:10 AM, said:
    It is simply begging the question, [...]
    Noesis has a point, but could have made it very simply. UPB as Stef has defined it prejudged any moral theory that involves violence (either in the violation or in the enforcement) as necessarily part of ethics, not neutral or even aesthetic. Universality requires it to be all or nothing, either always required or always proscribed. Can he really get all this from the norms implicit in argument? Or do we need additional restrictions, and an argument supporting them? 

    How do we define moral nihilism in the context of UPB? Noesis wants to just say "morality is subjective." But that is not a moral proposition, eligible for testing by UPB. We can't say moral nihilism is "all violence is aesthetic or neutral" by definition. Maybe Noesis should not be so quick to accept the UPB framework?
    Noesis, on 01 Feb 2011 - 10:18 PM, said:
    [...]
    The argument for neutrality goes like this: "Inflicting your will, or not inflicting your will on anyone is always (morally) right." [Keep in mind the definition of morality is: a [/size]principle concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behaviour.[/size]]
    Every possible action is either a case of inflicting to not inflicting your will. So we can simplify this to "Every possible action is always right." Not sure how to plug that in to the 2 guys in a room test. Does this mean they are obligated to be doing everything all the time? Have we re-introduced positive obligations?

    Noesis's definition of morality does not match Stef's (subset of UPB that is enforceable). She also either does not notice or intentionally ignores the unusual sense in which Stef uses the word "preference." Unless I am wrong, for Stef, preference is limited to items within the feasible choice set. So, although in some sense I may prefer to fly to Paris, by Stef's definition I do not prefer flying to Paris if I am not flying to Paris (or I've at least bought a ticket). This also undermines her thought experiment where she acts without or against her preferences. As long as she is consciously acting and has a set of feasible choices, her action reveals her preference. She can place herself in circumstances where her choice set is restricted, but that doesn't get her what she wants. Common usage allows us to use the word "preference" in either way, so that it makes sense that I would prefer something that I cannot actually choose, but Stef is using the word in the more narrow sense, and it is Noesis who is equivocating, not Stef, in this case.

    "Inflicting your will, or not inflicting your will on anyone is always (morally) right." This statement means that one of 3 possibilities exists, that is, one option, or the other is right, or both are right. If Noesis meant to say both are right, we should replace "or" with "and" in the statement. The original statement is ambiguous.

    Let's assume Noesis meant that both options are always right. "Inflicting your will [and] not inflicting your will on anyone both are always (morally) right." Does that make a difference? Within UPB, this means "nothing violates UPB." My version of Noesis's claim is "Morality is objective, but everything is permitted, no enforcement is required. It's all good."

    Noesis, on 31 Dec 2011 - 08:38 AM, said:
    [from page 13...]
    [quoting Nima]"Arguing against the conceptual existence of UPB requires engaging in a debate. But once someone engages in a debate to convince another person, he inevitably implies that all people at all times and at all places should rather prefer truth to falsehood."
    Noesis/
    No, that's completely false (and absurd). Anyone should be able to clearly see that debating doesn't imply this. [...] For example, if I say that you cannot use UPB to prove the truth of a MORAL CLAIM, and that doesn't mean that I'm saying you cannot use UPB to prove something else (like the logic behind a framework purporting to prove that you can use the said framework to prove a moral claim). See the difference? "UPB" is just a fancy way of saying "logic". 

    Habermas and Hoppe also use the performative contradiction idea, so "absurd" goes too far. Maybe controversial would be a better description, or arguable. Noesis's first statement sounds like she is not willing to consider the idea seriously enough to actually understand what Stef is saying. One of the secrets of wisdom is, if an intelligent person says something that seems absurd, it is highly probable that you misunderstand them.

    [Nima gives a version of Stef's definition of morality]

    Quoting Noesis:
    I don't accept this definition. The reasoning in support of this definition is flawed. It assumes that violent infliction is what morality should be about, before morality has been proven as a legitimate category for any actions, never mind only some. [...] what does behaviour that can be avoided have to do with morality, without begging the question that morality exists[...]

    Noesis raises a valid concern. Has Stef begged the question, has he cooked his assumptions and definitions in such a way that the system gives unjustified answers? But because she is unwilling to engage with Stef's derivation of these concepts, her argument boils down to "no, you're wrong!" That is, she does not show us the actual problem, she just asserts that it exists.

    Another person might suspect that Stef has actually derived his definitions and assumptions from the performative contradiction, and Noesis just doesn't understand the ideas she criticizes. On one hand, I am tempted to forgive her, because Stef's explanation is difficult to follow, and the forum posts responding to her criticisms fail to clarify the issue. On the other hand, she is not very specific in her requests for clarification. Instead of saying "Where does this definition come from?" she says something more like "You can't do that!"

    Ultimately, I may agree with her that Stef has pulled a fast one. But I want to do my due diligence before making my decision.

    Thursday, January 23, 2014

    Self-Detonating Counter-UPB Arguments

    Stef wants to show that someone who claims "UPB is wrong" by using logic and evidence, commits a performative contradiction by doing so. The norms of argument provide the basis for UPB. These norms include (there are more):
    * I value truth above falsehood, clarity above obfuscation.
    * Truth is objective.
    * I will correct others when I see they've made a mistake, and accept corrections from them when I have.

    Godel proved that logic has limits, but no one can use logic to prove that logic is useless. So, a logical syllogism that concluded, "therefore logic can prove nothing," is a performative contradiction. There may or may not be a logical error in the argument, but if it uses a method of proof that it explicitly rejects, that is a problem.

    If I somehow learn something I believe to be true, but the implications of this truth include the idea that I cannot or should not communicate it to someone, or it is meaningless or pointless for me to do so, can it really be true? (Hoppe's argumentation ethics and Habermas and Apel's discourse ethics have taken similar approaches.) This paradox invites us to conclude that the proposition must actually be false, no matter how much the proposition may tempt us to believe it. If we can only communicate an idea by becoming a hypocrite, there's something wrong with that idea.  

    If I explicitly reject the norms of argument, I can still speak the truth. If I decline to self-identify as a member of the fair-debate speech community, can all my claims be dismissed? No. Only those statements that contradict my current actions.

    This allows Stef to evade the "is/ought" problem without solving it. Here's what I mean. Someone says "UPB is wrong." According to Stef, that person has opted in, has demonstrated their willingness to debate and committed to the norms of debate. So any further debate can make use of those norms, and if that person contradicts the norms of debate, that is a performative contradiction and we should reject the claim. 

    So what Stef would really like to do is have UPB logically follow from the norms of debate. Everything in his book would then just be a derivation and explanation of those norms and their corollaries and implications. Unfortunately, the book is not organized in a way that makes it easy to see where he is going or whether he gets there.

    There are of course questions about this, even the more "mainstream" versions are controversial. Stef is not very explicit in his arguments or clear in his explanations. To attack this idea, you can argue that the specific norms do not follow from the activity of debate, or that we have no grounds to universalize them, that we could ignore them as soon as we stop debating, something like that.

    And UPB is more than logic. It is logic, evidence, universality, the coma test, the "2 guys in a room" test and all that other stuff. How can we get a performative contradiction from that? I can think of two possibilities: either it really all can be derived from Stef's premises using logic, or Stef has added something that he must support with argument. Maybe I can get universality from pure logic, and the coma test is a corollary of universality. What about the 2 guys in a room?

    This works for the scientific method and aesthetically preferred actions (APAs), but does it work for Stef's target, ethics? Could someone truthfully say (see Noesis http://board.freedomainradio.com/topic/26465-debate-about-upb-moral-nihilism/), "I accept the norms of argument, and the principles of UPB, but I believe all actions are morally right, no violation of UPB is possible," without contradicting norms of debate?

    This is all stuff I don't understand yet, still many questions in my mind.

    How do we know that the coma test and 2 guys in a room test work? Do they depend on anything other than universality?
    Given universality, if a proposition fails the tests it is false. If it passes, how do we know it is true? What does it really mean for a moral proposition to be true or false?

    Wednesday, January 22, 2014

    True and false moral propostitions in UPB

    How do we know the tests are sufficient, that UPB does not give the green light to bad ideas? The way the process works, if a proposition contains a logical contradiction or performative contradiction, I can see how it is reasonable to say it is false. But just because a proposition does not contain one sort of flaw, does not guarantee it does not have another. How can we be sure that Stef has covered all the possible flaws with his tests? A perfectly valid logical syllogism will be true only if it's premises are true.

    It is easier for me to think of a moral proposition as false than to know what it would mean for a moral proposition to be true. Certainly Stef is not saying that moral propositions that pass the UPB test can never be violated by anyone, like laws of physics. My best interpretation is that Stef would define truth for moral propositions like this: A moral proposition is true if it does not imply that persons must (may?) violate the norms and assumptions on which argument relies. Argument provides the means by which we communicate, and Stef's approach uses that as a foundation on which to build. A stronger way of putting it would be that true moral statements can be derived from or at least do not contradict the norms and assumptions underlying debate.

    If I somehow learn something I believe to be true, but the implications of this truth include the idea that I cannot or should not communicate it to someone, or it is meaningless or pointless for me to do so, can it really be true? (Hoppe and Habermas have taken similar approaches.) This contradiction invites us to conclude that the proposition must actually be false, no matter how much the proposition may tempt us to believe it. If we can only communicate an idea by embracing hypocrisy, there's something wrong with that idea.

    If a debater uses coercion to win a debate, at the instant she uses that tactic, the debate ceases to be a debate. Coercion cannot take part in debate. Coercion transforms debate into indoctrination, interrogation, threats, or brainwashing.

    This approach may owe more to Hans-Herman Hoppe http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argumentation_ethics than to Stefan Molyneux, I'm not sure. 

    Tuesday, January 21, 2014

    UPB in an eye dropper


    Here is my attempt to make the shortest possible summary of UPB:

    When someone makes a moral claim, when they use a sentence with the words "ought," or "must," or "should,"1 if their proposition doesn't apply to all moral agents, everywhere, for all time, then that person is a hypocrite and you can ignore their bogus claim. If it does apply universally, you need to take it seriously, but it shouldn't have logical contradictions or practical impossibilities.

    Where do the moral propositions come from? We do not derive them from the theory, we just apply the tests to claims we hear or devise ourselves. From this perspective, UPB is just a method we use to test any sort of proposition. If it fails the test, it is either not a moral proposition or it is not true. If it passes, it is a true moral proposition. Stef claims that a surprising number of conventional moral theories fail the test, containing some sort of special pleading or performative contradiction of the norms of argumentation. 

    Of course, a skeptic can still dispute Stef's conception of what argument actually presupposes. What argument does Stef present to support his idea of strong universality? Is it possible that moral propositions that pass the UPB test could contradict each other? I'm not sure how to answer those questions, but I want to think about them and others. If you have suggestions, please add them to the comments section.


    _________________
     1 Sometimes we use these words to show a logical or practical necessity, rather than a moral necessity. UPB only applies to moral propositions. I wanted this summary to be short, but still reasonably clear. I hope that helps.  ↩



    Sunday, January 19, 2014

    UPB Jargon

    Here are some terms used in the context of UPB that sometimes have special meanings. Quotes from Stefan Molyneux's book "Universally Preferred Behaviour" are in italics.

    Universal: A rule that is universal applies to all moral agents at all times and at all places. I discuss that at length in another post. And here I discuss the source of strong universality. Also see page 43.

    Morality and ethics: Stef uses these words interchangeably, but his meaning is distinct from common usage. These words refer to the UPB category dealing with violence, either when the violation of UPB involves physical violence, or when the enforcement mechanism may include violence. They are not avoidable, not consensual. Ethics violations involve unwilling participants, victims.
    UPB defines the boundary between ethics and aesthetics according to whether or not all participants are willing participants. I was having a problem dealing with fraud and theft, because they need not be violent. Fraud is sneaky theft, theft that is hidden, so the victim is not aware of being victimized until too late. There is a fine line between fraud, where I intend to fool you, and buyer's remorse, where you fooled yourself.
    Morals are a set of rules claiming to accurately and consistently identify universally preferable human behaviours, page 40. Those preferences which can be considered binding upon others can be termed “universal preferences,” or “moral rules," page 40. Ethics is the subset of UPB which deals with inflicted behaviour, or the use of violence. Any theory that justifies or denies the use of violence is a moral theory, and is subject to the requirements of logical consistency and empirical evidence, page 49. Morality is defined as an enforceable subset of UPB, page 76. The subset of UPB that examines enforceable behaviour is called “morality,” page 125.

    inflicted, violently inflicted: Stef also uses "forcibly inflicted" sometimes, so these phrases seem to have distinct meanings. If I inflict something on you, I do so without your consent. You have not participated in the choice. Why talk about inflicting, rather than consent or choice? If I do not use violence or force, what do I use? Deception?
    Force violates the moral requirement of avoidability, page 118. This capacity for escape and/or avoidance is an essential characteristic differentiating aesthetics from ethics, page 50. preferences for logic, truth and evidence, which are also binding upon others (although they are not usually violently inflicted. Page 40. Ethics is the subset of UPB which deals with inflicted 
    behaviour, or the use of violence. Page 48. (Are they synonyms or is he making a composite class composed of two sorts of things?) Wherever ethical theories are corrupt, self-contradictory and destructive, they must be inflicted upon the helpless minds of dependent children. Page 60.

    Avoidable: Stef uses this word in the ordinary way, but I included it because it plays such an important role, yet seems hard to objectify. Perhaps I am overstating this. Avoidable stuff happens only if everyone participating has given consent. Why did Stef use the idea of avoidance instead of consent?
    Non-violent actions by their very nature are avoidable. Page 48. This capacity for escape and/or avoidance is an essential characteristic differentiating aesthetics from ethics. Page 50. For the moment, we can assume that any threat of the initiation of violence is immoral, but the question of avoidance – particularly the degree of avoidance required – is also important. Page 51.

    Aesthetic: Universal preferences that have no element of violence, that are avoidable. In at least one place, Stef also includes non-universal personal preferences in this category. I find that a bit confusing, but I try not to worry too much.

    Binding: I read that as "the rule applies". I am tempted toward confusion because "binding" seems to have more of a connotation of "consequences are guaranteed to occur." But this cannot be the case. Stef seems to use it to deny choice, personal preferences do not bind anyone, but logical necessities, etc. cannot be chosen arbitrarily. 
    The fundamental difference between statements of preference and statements of fact is that statements of fact are objective, testable – and binding, page 22. Ethics as a discipline can be defined as any theory regarding preferable human behaviour that is universal, objective, consistent – and binding. Naturally, preferential behaviour can only be binding if the goal is desired. If I say that it is preferable for human beings to exercise and eat well, I am not saying that human beings must not sit on the couch and eat potato chips. What I am saying is that if you want to be healthy, you should exercise and eat well. [...] It is true that if a man does not eat, he will die – we cannot logically derive from that fact a binding principle that he ought to eat. page 30. We all know that there are subjective preferences, such as liking ice cream or jazz, which are not considered binding upon other people. On the other hand, there are other preferences, such as rape and murder, which clearly are inflicted on others. There are also preferences for logic, truth and evidence, which are also binding upon others (although they are not usually violently inflicted) insofar as we all accept that an illogical proposition must be false or invalid. Those preferences which can be considered binding upon others can be termed “universal preferences,” or “moral rules.” Page 40. 
    Enforceable preference vs. unenforceable preference: This seems obvious, but is it? Unenforceable preferences cannot involve violence, either in the violation or the enforcement. To inflict such preferences forcefully is itself a violation of UPB. But what exactly does it mean when Stef discusses enforceable preferences? Presumably, force can be used to enforce rules without violating UPB. Stef does not say much about that. During one podcast, I think he said it is an implementation issue. Here are the only mentions in the book:
    We will use the term aesthetics to refer to non-enforceable preferences – universal or personal – while ethics or morality will refer to enforceable preferences. Page 48.
    In some cases, Stef uses "enforceable preferences" to mean "violent preferences" or "preferences that can only be satisfied by use of violence." There's an awkward (for me) discussion of this at the end of this thread. Thanks to FDR member cynicist for help.
    Universal preference, preference: In common usage we may choose something from the feasible alternatives, while preferring something else. For Stef, personal preference is always about which item from the feasible choice set actually gets chosen. By "universal preference" Stef means a universal "ought," a moral principle that is universal and objective. A person's personal preference and the corresponding universal preference (moral principle) need not match, e.g. an embezzler may calmly decide he prefers to rob his employer, but the "universal preference"/moral principle is that he should not steal.
    "Stealing could be universally preferred. In other words, everyone in the world could wake up tomorrow and just decide to become a thief. It's not likely, but it's possible. But [...] stealing cannot be universally preferable."  So, "universally preferred" means everyone actually does prefer it, "universally preferable" is a jargon phrase which means more or less everyone ought to prefer it and make choices as if they preferred it, although they may not actually prefer it or make choices as if they did.
    In ordinary speech, Preference gives a ranking. Given a set of choices, a preference determines which alternative is chosen. UPB wants a set of prohibitions. Stef says almost nothing about what you ought to do, discussing instead what you should be punished for. Using the word "preference" as jargon introduces confusion and ambiguity. This is really universally allowed behavior, or universally prohibited behavior, maybe universally enforced behaviour. 
    Evil: That which we can enforce against. Good usually just refers to the avoidance of evil, but without clearly distinguishing it from morally neutral actions. Self-defense cannot be “evil,” since evil by definition can be prevented through force. Page 87

    Opposite: Stef doesn't actually use a different definition for this word, but he uses it in a context that confused some of his critics. For example, he begins by examining several possible categories (always good, sometimes good, positively aesthetic, personally preferred, neutral, etc.) He uses some of his other definitions to narrow down the range of possibilities to consider, so that only 2 possibilities remain. In that context, it is a bit confusing but not technically incorrect to use "not X" and "the opposite of X" interchangeably. Given the narrow context of the discussion, where he considers only two possibilities, "not X" and "the opposite of X" both refer to the same concept.
    Obligation: