Ethics of Voting, Revisited

Can I vote ethically? 

Voters, in effect, direct candidates to implement the promises the candidates made during their campaign. We can think of the election as creating a conditional contract - if enough people vote for it, it takes effect. Although the voters cannot literally instruct the office holders after they are elected and have no recourse if the candidates renege on their promises, by voting the voters do in some sense give instructions in the form of those campaign promises to their chosen candidates. The candidate says “this is what I plan to do” and the voters reply, in effect, “yes, you do that”. And so one prerequisite for voting ethically would be for the candidate one chose to solemnly and credibly promise not to use the power of their office unethically.

Principals who direct an agent to act for them share responsibility for the consequences of the action. If the principals have no right to act on their own, they cannot delegate such a right to their agents.

Even if the deed is never actually done, a principal cannot ethically command an agent to do something unethical. Just as I would be wrong to shoot at you and miss, I would be wrong to give the order to kill you, even if no one obeys the order. Principals can direct agents ethically only if the principal gives ethical directions and the agent carries them out ethically.

Voters lack some of the rights of principals, but still share responsibility for the plans of the candidates, as if the candidates acted as agents for the voters. The details differ, but the same principle applies. If I intend to cause something to happen, I am responsible for the consequences. I am included among the persons who should pay compensation or make amends.

So, the ethics of voting depends on the ethics of the candidate and the candidate's campaign promises. If I could hire the candidate to carry out those instructions without violating ethics, I can vote to have them carried out without violating ethics. Voters can vote ethically if they find candidates who credibly promise ethically to fulfill their campaign promises. From a voluntaryist standpoint, this appears theoretically possible but practically impossible.

Voluntaryist ethical concerns about the ethics of political office holders might include the ethics of:

• instructing enforcers to enforce legislation and taxation upon persons who have not consented,
• fulfilling the duties and prerequisites of office, such as taking the oath of office,
• accepting a salary and an office budget funded by taxes,
• perpetuating the institution of government, the social environment it creates and its illusion of legitimacy.

I wonder, will the candidates exceed their campaign promises in an unethical way? Are they credible? I could argue that principals share no responsibility for an action taken by their agent if the action violates their instructions. But I could also argue that this holds only if the principals have good reason to treat the agents as credible or have the power to monitor and end the principal/agent relationship as soon as they learn of unethical behavior. If the principals know that the agent is prone to ethical violations, and they have no means to nullify their contract, they can hardly avoid taking some responsibility for entrusting that person as their agent. If there is no way for me to monitor or constrain my agents, I must take extra care in selecting them, and if I fail to choose wisely I share the blame for the agents' actions.

So the question, “can I vote ethically”, boils down to, can I find a candidate that credibly promises to behave ethically while holding office? By voluntaryist standards, no such candidate has ever run for office or likely ever will. Such candidates could theoretically behave ethically, but only if they would vote “no” on every bill except repeals and refuse to accept any tax-funded benefits until taxation and obedience to legislation were made voluntary. 

Social contract criticisms

I’m not enough of a scholar to really illustrate the history and details of other peoples social contract theories, but I sketch out some notes below. 

Hobbes' idea amounts to a metaphorical social contract that justifies anything the state does. Any situation that we consider bad because of the depredations of the state can be made worse by imagining a mob carrying out the same depredations but adding new victims in the form of those who for whatever reason would have been safe from the state. No one can amend the social contract and the state faces no limit. It is purely pragmatic, based on no principle more lofty than “might makes right” or “as bad as this is, it could be worse.” This version of the social contract justifies anything done by the state, including genocide.

Locke had the idea that rights precede the social contract. The social contract merely provides a means to enforce those pre-existing rights.

Rousseau wrote about the general will and direct democracy on a small scale. 

The social contract means government authority consists of the consent of the governed. Citizens consent to pay taxes and obey laws, and the state promises to protect the rights of citizens. Both the citizens and the state accept obligations as parties to a contract. Agents of the state may coerce citizens because the citizens have agreed in advance and because the state organization fulfills its obligations. But if they have not agreed, or if the state fails to fulfill its bargain, then the social contract fails to justify political authority.

Huemer gives several criticisms of the social contract. The social contract as described by Locke (or any of the others) is not historically accurate (as pointed out by Hume). Citizens cannot be viewed as giving passive or tacit consent, because consent is not voluntary if 

• Consent was obtained under duress, if one must obey or be forced to sacrifice something to which one has a right,
• explicit dissent has been expressed, which overrules implicit consent,
• explicit refusal to consent would not change anything (the contractual counterpart will do the same thing regardlesss of consent), or
• the counterpart reneges on its contractual obligations, or in fact has none.

Huemer argues that these exceptions describe all existing states to some extent, so that none truly can claim authority on the basis of the consent of the governed. We have a right to free association, including a right to our jobs, our friends and families, and property rights to our land. If we cannot opt out of state authority without emigrating and sacrificing all these, the first condition applies. If anarchists are subjected to the same laws and taxes as superpatriots, then the second and third conditions apply. Huemer cites several court cases that conclude that the US “federal” government owes no specific obligation to any specific person, but only a general duty to the citizens as a group. Hence, if the social contract obligates the state at all, it has failed to fulfill those obligations. Huemer says, “One cannot maintain that the individual owes duties to the state but that the state owes nothing to the individual.” He concludes that social contract theory does not apply to the USA or any other modern state.

Huemer has a separate chapter dealing with the hypothetical social contract of John Rawls. Read Huemer's book if you are interested, I’m not prepared to give a serious summary of that argument.. 

Andrew Kern has a series of blog posts criticizing conventional social contract 

Conventional approaches to social contract seek to justify existing states by weakening the meaning of consent. The bottom line is, if we regard the social contract as an actual contract requiring actual informed consent, existing states cannot use the social contract to justify their activities. But what if we used a strong concept of consent and seriously applied the idea that legitimate authority flows from the consent of those affected? I want to answer that question next.

[This is part of my project on the purely voluntary society]

Purely Voluntary Society project meta information

This blog has been a bit random so far. I am embarking on a project that will unify at least most of the new entries. I’ve been generating tons of notes on various ideas that are related. I guess if I was well organized and knew what I was doing they would turn into a book outline. But I don’t know what I am doing. So I’m going to start putting out blog entries on a single narrow question each. Each entry will include questions that I’ve left unanswered that I am aware of. Then eventually I will write entries to answer each of those questions. I hope that at some point this network of related ideas will be able to be turned into an outline that makes some sense. But at first it’s going to skip around a lot.

The first questions consider the idea of the social contract. I want to review Heumer's reasons (and some others) for rejecting the conventional social contract justification of state authority. Then I will consider how the social contract idea changes if we apply a stronger version of consent.

As with all my blog posts, in these I am thinking out loud. Please put suggestions, criticisms or corrections in the comments. I will appreciate it.

A common law perspective on abortion

Who has standing to bring legal action on the part of the child/fetus/entity, only the child's guardian, or everyone? How does fertilization create obligation? 

Implicitly, the pro-life position claims that everyone has standing to bring charges against the mother at any time for killing her child or failing to care for the child until someone else can take over. Does this position make sense?

I interpret common law to say that persons only have standing if their consent has been violated, or if they act as agents for persons whose consent has been violated. (Damaging someone's property accidentally without their consent constitutes a tort, purposefully using their bodies or property without their consent constitutes a crime.) This prevents busybodies from from bringing frivolous cases or violating the free association of others. To bring suit, one must have standing. No standing, no case. If the person who has been harmed does not wish to sue or to bring charges, no suit or charges should be brought. If some third party wishes to sue or bring charges, they must show how they have been damaged or had their consent violated. So even with regard to murder, it might be the case that some persons have standing to bring charges and others do not.

Children do not have standing on their own, only competent adults can sue or be sued. This means that children need guardians to stand for them in court. But the role of guardian does not only consist of standing for them in court and taking responsibilities for any crimes or torts they commit. It also requires the guardian to nurture the child. The owner of a domestic animal also stands for the animal in court, but the role of guardian is more intimate and has more obligations associated with it.

If the mother refuses to act as guardian of her child, the father may take this role. If the father is also unwilling, any relative may take on the role. If no relatives exist, or they are all unwilling, then the child can be put up for adoption. But while the child is not viable outside the womb, only the mother can actually fulfill all the requirements of a guardian.

In an ordinary murder case, the victims have standing, and since they are dead, their heirs have standing to bring charges, at least. Perhaps anyone has standing to bring charges of murder of an adult or independent child. The case of a pregnant woman is no different, if we assume the child is viable outside the womb.

If a child is murdered in the womb, it is the guardian who has standing to bring charges. Or is it everyone? Let’s consider both.

Consider the period of time when the child is not viable outside the womb. During that time, the mother is the only person who can truly act as guardian for the child. Only she can nourish it and nurture it. If that is the case, only she can act as guardian, and only she has standing to bring charges. If I sue her, seeking to be declared the guardian of her child, I can bring the most compelling sorts of evidence and yet I am physically incapable of  replacing her. No matter how good my arguments are, if I am unable to physically replace the mother and sustain the child's life, the suit is futile, there is no remedy available. Either the child is removed from the mother's womb and dies, or it remains and the mother's consent is violated.

Imagine that I was able to become the legal guardian in spite of this. Clearly I am violating the mother's consent. She is forced to continue the pregnancy unwillingly. What obligates her to do so?

Some would say that when she engaged in sexual intercourse, she tacitly agreed to the consequence. I think there are good reasons to consider this tacit agreement not binding. Specific performance of a contractual obligation to perform services is a form of slavery or indentured servitude, and does not belong in the jurisprudence of a free society. In ordinary contracts, when a party to the agreement wants to incentivize another to assure performance, the remedy is to have collateral involved, so that failure to perform the service triggers a change of ownership of the collateral. This remedy is not available for tacit agreements such as engaging in sex. And with whom is the agreement made, to whom is the obligation owed? The child does not yet exist, and they will not be competent to enter into contractual agreements for a long time, should they come into existence. Since the mother is the default guardian of the child, this is an agreement between the woman and herself. No one has standing to sue the mother for violating this contract. Maybe the father? But then the father could give consent for the abortion. And as pointed out before, the father cannot fulfill the role of guardian while the child is not yet viable.

Perhaps she is obligated because the fetus is a human being. Then maybe everyone has standing to bring charges. Can they bring charges against a woman for getting a hysterectomy while not pregnant? Can they bring charges against a man for ejaculating and not rescuing all the sperm? If it was technically feasible to fertilize all of a woman's eggs, would she be obligated to do so? Would a man be obligated to rescue every sperm that escaped his body, or even a significant fraction, if it were technically feasible to do so? How does fertilization create obligation? 

Fertilization marks a significant milestone in the development of a child, but there is no obvious reason to consider it to create a line between when an egg is part of the mother's body and when it is a human child. Eggs and sperm are human, and they are alive. Catholics worry about unfertilized eggs, but even they give up with sperm. 

The alternative is to give the guardian the choice of when and whether a pregnancy represents a person who cannot be killed. She has standing to bring charges against a murderer. No one else does. Unless she prosecutes herself, she cannot be prosecuted.

There is a period of time when the child is potentially viable outside the womb, but to remove the child from the womb without killing it will be very costly and difficult for the mother. The new guardian is responsible for all expenses and perhaps for compensating the mother.

I conclude that for anyone to have standing to prevent an abortion, they must be willing and able to act as the child's guardian, and in fact take on that role immediately, paying all medical expenses, etc. There is a period of time during which this is technically infeasible. During that time, the mother may abort the fetus at will, demonstrating her withdawal of her consent from the pregnancy. She has no agreement with any other person, and if she did it would not be binding. As the guardian of the potential child, only she has standing to bring charges against herself. 

As technology improves, the duration of this period will probably become shorter. We all can look forward to the day when all such children can be rescued without violating the consent of the mother.

This is where the blog post should have ended. But during editing I found a big error.

Rather than rewrite the whole thing, I want to leave it as is and now discuss the big error. You get to experience it just like I did!

What if a person was murdered by his heir? If only the heir has standing, then no one can bring charges of murder against the heir. This is a huge problem.

What does this establish about who has standing to bring charges of murder? We don’t want it to only be the guardian or the heir, or those persons have a free pass to commit murder. It sort of works with the guardian, since persons who would have been willing to become guardian could have standing. Once the child can live apart from the mother, she has an obligation to transfer guardianship rather than kill the child. Can we find a parallel for heirs? I would have been willing to adopt the victim into my family, so I have standing to bring charges of murder against the heir? Or just anyone can bring charges against the guardian or heir? 

Anyhow, this undermines my argument.

Imagine that a pregnant woman is involved in an accident that makes her miscarry. She may be heartbroken by the death of her child, or she might feel relieved of a burden. She gets to choose the significance of that event for her. If she chose not to sue the tortfeasor, who would have standing to sue them  against her wishes? This implies she has the power to choose. If instead she confers with an abortionist to terminate her pregnancy, is this really different? If it was an accident, she is within her rights to forgive the person responsible. She could also forgive an attempt at murder against herself, though others might want to prosecute.

Does the mother get to decide, am I the guardian of a child, or the possessor of a domestic animal or lump of tissue? If I am the guardian of a child, no one may kill my child. If I am the possessor of a domestic animal, I may kill it. If the child cannot be rescued, others must accept her attitude. Once it is possible, they may rescue the child.

Can she bring the child to term and continue to consider it a domestic animal? If so, someone can sue to become guardian.  Guardian trumps owner. Can you imagine the court proceeding? One person arguing she owns the child as a domestic animal, the other side arguing that they wish to adopt the child. I think the guardians ought to win, even in the case of an actual domestic animal. If someone is willing to rescue an animal from a factory farm and make it their pet, I think they have a case. Someone willing to rescue a child from being treated as an animal has even better grounds for taking action..

When should we have empathy for the potential child? Do we have empathy for unferilized eggs and individual sperm cells? Why? Now conception happens. Why should I feel empathy for a single cell organism? The cell may divide and become embedded in the mother's womb. When should I feel empathy? I think it is when the mother commits to herself to the pregnancy. And if she changes her mind before the child can feasibly be rescued, I do not want to coerce her to fulfill her commitment. I think it should be voluntary from beginning to end. No one should hold a gun to her head, even if they promise to take custody of the child at the earliest possible and agreeable moment.

This is a draft, feel free to suggest improvements in the comments.

Was Marshall Rosenberg an anarchist?

“We were not meant to succumb to the dictates of should and have to, whether they come from outside or inside of ourselves. And if we do yield and submit to these demands, our actions arise from an energy that is devoid of life-giving joy.”

“After we gain clarity regarding the need being served by our actions, we can experience those actions as play even when they involve hard work, challenge, or frustration.”

~Marshall Rosenberg

Marshall Rosenberg's Nonviolent communication reframes face-to-face human interaction, seeking to replace domination with empathy and compassion. The more intimately I connect to a person, the more I can gain from using NVC. I want to make requests, not demands, and when others make demands I want to hear requests.

How can we scale this up to the level of a large organization, a society or polity?

The CEO of a large firm can’t negotiate with every individual supplier, employee and customer. Ideally, organizational structures could encourage empathy and communication among all participants, aligning organizational strategy with the needs of participating groups. But this provides a serious communication and organizational challenge. Does this make success more or less likely? Does it change the criteria for success? Why has the existing system evolved to favor domination so strongly? Are there any good examples of organizations that have evaded this problem?

We can see domination even more clearly when we look at the state. State agents make demands. They threaten to punish those that disobey their commands. I can imagine a legal system that allows dissidents to say no to social customs. But I think it stretches the concept of a nation state to imagine a state that makes only requests. If I can refuse a state command without getting threatened with punishment, I think we are discussing a different sort of organization. 

Does Rosenberg manage to hear state demands as requests that he can always grant willingly? He came close to answering this question when he described how his father and grandfather paid taxes with enthusiasm because they “were desirous supporting a government they believed was protecting people in a way the czar had not. Imagining the many people whose welfare was being served by their tax money, they felt earnest pleasure as they sent their checks to the US government.” What about the taxes they paid to the czar before they emigrated? What need do I fulfill when I obey the commands of state agents? How do I find the fun in that? Even if they mean well, how can such a one-sided negotiation represent anything but domination? Can the state somehow restore the life-giving joy to an act motivated primarily by my desire to escape punishment?

Maybe Rosenberg's NVC idea applies only in face-to-face relationships and not in large-scale market transactions or nation-wide coordination efforts. How do we scale it up? Does he have an interpretation of his theory that translates state coercion into empathy? Or does his work offer a method to replace the demands inherent in the current workings of the state? 

Perhaps Rosenberg's insight applies only to small-scale interaction. Or maybe it points to the possibility of different forms of organization capable of coordinating people’s actions without using threats. Wouldn’t that be interesting?

Questions for Sullivan on Derrida on Forgiveness

These are questions I have about an episode of James and the Giant Podcast where James Sullivan (I call him James from now on, I hope he would call me Dave) discusses Derrida's (I call him Derrida, he's dead) essay On Forgiveness. No essay can cover all the bases completely, but I will discuss some of the gaps that prevent me from fully understanding or agreeing. If the podcast concludes something like, here is a long list of things we might think of as forgiveness, but they really aren't, I agree. But I disagree with nearly every explanation of this conclusion they give.

First, let me attempt a short summary of what I think the podcast was about. James has Derrida argue for the idea that no one can attain the ideal of pure forgiveness. An organization or a state cannot forgive, it only can happen in an actual person's heart. If forgiveness is conditional on repentance or restitution or anything else, it is not really forgiveness, it is a negotiated transaction, a deal. For the forgiven person even to ask for forgiveness spoils it to some degree. Justice and forgiveness are completely independent and distinct: justice can be fulfilled without any forgiveness, and forgiveness can exist without any justice.

According to James, Derrida carefully considers these cases of faux forgiveness. But according to me, neither of them takes it where it needs to go. Derrida and James think of forgiveness as an interaction between two persons, one that requires both of them to participate. But I can forgive someone who knows nothing about my forgiveness or someone who died without repenting or asking for forgiveness. Forgiveness requires a subject and an object, but the object does not need to participate actively. A person forgives or does not forgive, that's all. Resentment transforms to resignation, blame transforms to cause and effect. Forgiveness drains the situation of moralistic judgement.

After I am forgiven, forgiveness is over. Whatever I do with the knowledge that I am forgiven is something else: maybe redemption, maybe repentance, maybe reform, maybe indifference, even hostility or resentment, but not forgiveness.

Now a short digression: If I forgive you, this will affect our relationship, but these after-effects are not forgiveness itself (or even examples of it). Perhaps we both desire these after-effects, but I cannot accomplish forgiveness merely by wanting to forgive. It is not fully voluntary, it's more like wanting to learn calculus. I can try, but I may fail. If I try and I succeed, does that diminish the result compared to the same situation if I accomplished it without effort or intent? Do we care about the process as much as the result? I don't think I do.

Now back to the show. I will quote from James' podcast and comment as we go along. The action starts at about minute 6. 

“He [Derrida] deconstructs three main categories of forgiveness and we'll go into each one. First, forgiveness between two individuals; second, forgiveness between the state and an individual (by the state I mean any sovereign power, could be a king, government, school or church); third, forgiveness between states. This refers to the relationship between different nations.” Already this seems odd. I think I have never heard anyone speak of forgiveness between nations, and that if someone did that I would take it as highly metaphorical. Similarly, when an accused person gets a verdict of “not guilty” in court, I would not expect anyone to describe this as the state forgiving someone. If instead we use it to describe a guilty verdict, complete with a sentence to punishment, and the completion of the sentence, does that count as forgiveness on the part of the state? I don’t think so. In a way, this is Derrida's point, but if so it’s a trivial one, and made in a roundabout and confusing way. Justice is separate from forgiveness.

Perhaps this is metaphor? But then it is bad metaphor. Maybe that is Derrida's point, or part of it, and part of James' interpretation. Why spend so much time debunking a metaphor that is rarely (never?) used? 

What isn’t a sovereign power, if we include schools and churches in that category? Why shouldn’t corporations also count? Or families and individuals? What does such a weak distinction accomplish?

“When we talk about forgiveness in this text, in order to simplify even our base conception of what forgiveness is as an idea, we will take it to mean forgiveness in the Abrahamic religious sense.” What does this accomplish? What alternatives are we abandoning? My conception of what forgiveness is certainly has been influenced by religious ideas, but how would this article (and Derrida's original) have to change if we dropped this assumption?

Maybe Derrida and James want to contrast ordinary forgiveness with the sort of forgiveness that a Catholic receives during confession? (Or is that absolution, not forgiveness?) That does seem to require more than one participant and genuine repentance from the guilty party. But then no human is actually doing any forgiving. The difference between the sort of forgiveness that I can experience as the one doing the forgiving and the sort of forgiveness that Catholics experience as the objects of god's forgiveness seems like an interesting criticism of that religion, but Derrida and James do not go there. So  why specify that we refer to the Abrahamic flavor? What are the other flavors?

“‘In principle’, Derrida begins, ‘there is no limit to forgiveness, no measure, no moderation, no to what point.’ [...]  Forgiveness is often confounded, sometimes in a calculated fashion, with related themes: excuse, regret, amnesty. But Derrida states that these are separate things from forgiveness; they are heterogeneous. Do not confuse them.” We should avoid confusing forgiveness for these other things, but what is forgiveness and how does it differ? This is not unpacked. Is it a mental state? An emotion? A declaration? An activity? A transformation? A process with a product? A ritual to perform? A role to play? 

“The idea of forgiveness requires an idea or conception of the unforgivable, and these two are tied together ... forgiveness and the unforgivable. You can only forgive, Derrida deduces, the unforgivable. What else is there to forgive? If you forgive the forgivable then you have done nothing; certainly nothing extraordinary or virtuous. Forgiving the unforgivable is Derrida’s paradox.” This just seems wrong. How shall I argue against this? Maybe I could refute them if they gave reasons to think so. But they don’t bother. I guess it is obvious? 

Why should I think of forgiveness as something that ought to qualify as extraordinary? It may occur less often than the alternative of holding a grudge. Is that all? 

Is it virtuous to forgive? Do Catholics number it among the 7 virtues? Nope. Did the Stoics consider it a virtue? Nope. Maybe contemporary culture has come to associate forgiveness with Jesus and other saintly figures, and so it got promoted? The Lord's Prayer exhorts us to forgive our debtors or those who trespass against us, but does that mean forgiveness is a virtue or is that just good advice?

Maybe Derrida/James means that only the purest forgiveness is true forgiveness, so only the unforgivable is truly worthy of forgiveness? Why would I think that?

What else is there to forgive, besides the unforgivable? Certainly, anything that bothers me, I can forgive. Maybe anything that someone wants forgiveness for? The unforgiven.

“We cannot pinpoint forgiveness in itself because it is abstract. We can point to acts of forgiveness, examples of forgiveness, but they are all representations of the thing and not the thing itself.” This is hard for me to follow. Would examples of elephants be representations of elephants and not elephants themselves? They are elephants but not "elephant". Okay, forgiveness is not a concrete thing we can point at, like an elephant. But James and Derrida are dancing around the point. Solid examples to point at satisfy me, and I am perplexed by this denial that examples can help. Why not? Can we find something helpful then, please? Maybe Derrida attacks all abstractions and generalizations, and this is only an instance?

“What I ask, does forgiveness feel like? Does it have an associative emotion? How do we describe it?  Is it something an individual has, since it is something which must be given?” They ask, but do not tell.

“It is infinite, which is why it holds so much importance in religious language, because it mirrors or mimics the divine.” Huh? I mean... Huh? Just going to leave that lying there?

“We’ve already stated that pure forgiveness can only exist between two individuals: the guilty and the victim; and that there must not be a third that intervenes.” And actually, the guilty need not participate actively. Note that this also implies that I do not actively forgive, it is an event that happens to me, not a process that I engage in or a decision I make. This seems too restricted. I can decide I want to forgive. I can take actions or think thoughts intended to get me ultimately to forgive. And if I can do these things, others might also do them either intentionally or unintentionally. Why does this make the forgiveness impure? If it does, why do I care about purity?

“Language itself intervenes as a third. Can there be, Derrida asks, in one way or another, a scene of forgiveness without a shared language?” Can’t I forgive my cat? It feels a lot like forgiveness. But perhaps cats are not capable of responsibility or guilt. But again, forgiveness is something I do. It has an object, but the object does not participate actively. If I am capable of feeling resentment toward my cat for something it has done, or holding it "responsible", can't I also forgive it? Certainly I am capable of doing the opposite, of placing blame on it, holding a grudge and wallowing in resentment. But perhaps this is faux forgiveness also, since the cat can't take responsibility, having no obligations or rights that would depend on its nonexistent ability to understand and participate in a reciprocal social interaction. Our relationship is one-sided, paternalistic; we can't achieve reciprocity. Can I distinguish between forgiving the cat for sinning and recognition of the fact that the cat is incapable of sinning? The result seems very similar, though I arrive there by a different process.

"Derrida, in this entire essay, makes claims about the guilty party or person being transformed in asking for forgiveness. This is because the person who does something unforgivable is different from the person repenting or asking you for forgiveness, which means they are no longer guilty as such, or as guilty. Think about someone who while blackout drunk does something utterly unforgiveable. [...] The person the next day is not the same person." In what relevant way are they different persons, rather than the same person in a different context? How does this difference accomplish what Derrida claims, without making the entire exercise of forgiveness into a mistake? Derrida and his interpreter leave this unstated.

If I forgive you, you are the same person that violated me, at least for the purposes of dealing with the aftermath of that event. If you have shown yourself to be dangerous, I shall adjust to the danger. If you have shown yourself to be careless, I shall adjust to the uncertainty this creates. If you have shown yourself to disregard social customs, I need to find a different basis on which to interact with you, or avoid interacting. From these various vantage points, you are necessarily the same person. How is the context of forgiveness different? Is my forgiveness impure if after you damage my car I take back the car keys I lent you? Does forgiveness require me to act as if I still think you are a safe driver after you prove the opposite? Or can I forgive you, take appropriate measures, and move on?

Does forgiveness erase guilt? Guilt lives in the context of justice, which Derrida and James separate from the context of forgiveness. Guilt also lives with morality, but it is a different sort of guilt. Perhaps forgiveness has nothing to do with either.

Can I forgive as the result of a conscious strategy? Can forgiveness come as a by-product of reconciliation, redemption, or some other conscious process intended to produce it (among other things)? If forgiveness is a state of mind, how does the process that created it prevent it from being what it is? So James must mean that it is not a state of mind, or at least not a state of mind or mental event alone. Or perhaps the context that they use to disqualify forgiveness does so by spoiling the state of mind also? If I have already forgiven someone, will this be spoiled by them asking for forgiveness or claiming to repent? But then it is not really conditional. Must all sorts of preliminary preparations, if done with the conscious intent of producing forgiveness, undermine their own objective?

Why do I believe that forgiveness has nothing to do with the unforgivable? Can Derrida and James agree with me on this, but reach the same conclusion? Their claim is oddly psychological and a priori at the same time. Their analysis hints at a theory of language and meaning that seems unhelpful in this instance. Maybe if I understood that theory better and convinced myself that it applies in other contexts, I might abandon my objections.

What if I approached this as one who seeks to understand rather than as one who seeks to find fault? Derrida's purpose, seen through James' lens, seems primarily negative, to convince us that several ways of talking make no sense. I already think most of them are nonsense, though maybe not as nutty as the idea that forgiveness depends on the unforgivable. What can I gain from Derrida and James? What is at stake? They certainly inspired a lot of questions.

Argumentation Ethics steelman

Summary of argumentation ethics
When I argue I presuppose everything that argumentation requires me to presuppose. I might not articulate or consciously believe these propositions, and indeed I may deny them with my words, but I must act in a way that does not violate them. If I fail to act to make them true, I am no longer arguing; I am reciting, meditating, propagandizing, indoctrinating, coercing, fighting, or just engaging in some activity other than argumentation.

If during the course of an argumentation I arrive at a conclusion that contradicts one of my presuppositions, that contradiction invalidates my argument, by the same logic as would apply if I could derive a contradiction from assumptions I have made explicitly. 

According to Hans-Hermann Hoppe, argumentation presupposes some private property proposition (PPP). A criticism of self-ownership or private property involves the denial of PPP. By arguing that private property is inferior or wrong or should be eliminated and replaced with something else, I violate what I presupposed by engaging in argumentation and thereby create a performative contradiction. This contradiction refutes my criticism.

What is PPP?

Hoppe discusses the presuppositions of argumentation in this talk. Here is a long quote:

“The praxeological presuppositions of argumentation, then, i.e., what makes argumentation as a specific form of truth-seeking activity possible, are twofold: a) each person must be entitled to exclusive control or ownership of his physical body […] so as to be able to act independently of one another and come to a conclusion on his own, i.e., autonomously, and b), for the same reason of mutually independent standing and autonomy, both proponent and opponent must be entitled to their respective prior possessions, i.e., the exclusive control of all other, external means of action appropriated indirectly by them prior to and independent of one another and prior to the on-set of their argumentation.
“Any argument to the contrary: that either the proponent or the opponent is not entitled to the exclusive ownership of his body and all prior possessions cannot be defended without falling into a pragmatic or performative contradiction. For by engaging in argumentation, both proponent and opponent demonstrate that they seek a peaceful, conflict-free resolution to whatever disagreement gave rise to their arguments. Yet to deny one person the right to self-ownership and prior possessions is to deny his autonomy and his autonomous standing in a trial of arguments. It affirms instead dependency and conflict, i.e., heteronomy, rather than conflict-free and autonomously reached agreement and is thus contrary to the very purpose of argumentation.”

We can construct a version of PPP by rearranging Hoppe's description quoted above.

PPP: “[I am] entitled to exclusive control or ownership of [my] physical body […] so as to be able to act independently of [others] and come to a conclusion on [my] own, i.e., autonomously and for the same reason of mutually independent standing and autonomy, [both I and my interlocutors are] entitled to [our] prior possessions, i.e., the exclusive control of all other, external means of action appropriated indirectly by [us] prior to and independent of [others] and prior to the on-set of [this] argumentation. [I] seek a peaceful, conflict-free resolution to whatever disagreement gave rise to [our] arguments. 

Why is PPP presupposed by argumentation?

Argumentation presupposes that participants make up their own minds and participate fully in an effort to resolve a disagreement by arriving at an agreed conclusion by peaceful means. This requires them to act and think independently of others in a relevant sense, not subject to duress or other forms of influence from anyone. If participants in an argument lack this quality of independence, they cannot pursue the purpose of argumentation, they cannot truly resolve their dispute and come to agreement. In the extreme, if I hold a gun to your head and tell you what arguments to listen to or to make, we will never really come to agreement. I cannot force you to believe something. Every influence aimed at a purpose other than finding genuine agreement may lead the process off the true path. If I can “win” an argument by threatening violence or offering bribes, this derails real argumentation. We fail to,persuade or even understand each other. Argumentation presupposes that participants rise above such counterproductive distractions and motives. When they fail to do so, argumentation itself fails.

I am entitled to exclusive control of my body in the sense that it is common knowledge that no one else may control my body without my permission. If others could control me or were entitled to control me, this would count as duress.

Why must critics of liberty and private property deny PPP?

Critics of private property proclaim that no one is entitled to certain kinds of prior possessions. They seek to violently confiscate others' prior property, not to resolve their disagreement peacefully. So they contradict "I seek a peaceful, conflict-free resolution".

I still consider this blog entry a draft. Any helpful suggestions left in the comments will be used to improve future versions.